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Learning from the Jordan Compact
Katharina Lenner and Lewis Turner
Analysis of the implementation of the Jordan Compact offers three key lessons: 
governmental approval is important but not sufficient, the incorporation of critical voices is 
crucial, and meeting numeric targets is not the same as achieving underlying goals. 
The formal integration of Syrians into the 
labour markets of Syria’s neighbouring 
countries was something of a taboo for the 
first five years of the Syria crisis. Middle 
Eastern governments steadfastly refused to 
contemplate it. Nor, typically, did they allow 
humanitarian actors to undertake livelihoods 
programming for Syrians. This changed 
in February 2016, at a donor conference in 
London, when Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey all 
publicly committed themselves to improving 
economic opportunities for Syrian refugees. 
Jordan has gone furthest in seeking to 
make its general commitment a reality. The 
‘Jordan Compact’, announced at the end of 
the donor conference, envisaged the provision 
of up to 200,000 work permits for Syrians 
over the coming years.1 It has since become 
a laboratory for livelihoods programming 
with refugees in protracted displacement. 
Just over 80,000 work permits were issued 
to or renewed by Syrians by January 2018, 
yet – almost two years in – the initial 
enthusiasm of humanitarian actors has given 
way to surprise at the challenges they face 
in implementing the Compact. The overall 
count used in official reporting is somewhat 
misleading – it includes not only renewals 
but also several thousand permits issued to 
the same people upon switching jobs, as well 
as a few hundred temporary (that is, non-
annual) permits. The number of work permits 
valid at any one point in time is considerably 
lower than the overall figure (estimated 
at around 35,000-45,000), and there is a 
widespread perception among humanitarian 
actors that it will be extremely difficult to 
reach the 200,000 target by whichever metric. 
A number of lessons can be drawn from 
analysing implementation of the Compact.2
resilience and development in the region, and 
multi-year financing, concessional finance, 
trade access, economic opportunities and 
jobs are important elements of that vision. 
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1. High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing (2016) Too 
important to fail – addressing the humanitarian financing gap,  
Report to the UN Secretary-General, p8 
http://bit.ly/UN-HumFinancing-2016
2. Two of these plans have since become multi-year: the Jordan 
Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2017-2019 
http://bit.ly/JordanResponse-2017-19 and the Lebanon Crisis 
Response Plan 2017-2020 www.un.org.lb/lcrp2017-2020 
3. UNDP, ILO and WFP (2017) Jobs Make the Difference: Expanding 
Economic Opportunities for Syrian Refugees and Host Communities, 
Egypt – Iraq – Jordan – Lebanon – Syria – Turkey  
www.jobsmakethedifference.org/full-report 
4. The Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) 
is funded by a consortium of eight European donors to support 
Lebanon, Jordan and KRI to better understand, plan for and 
mitigate the impact of forced displacement of Syrian refugees. 
http://rdpp-me.org/RDPP/index.php     
5. See article by Lenner and Turner in this issue.
6. UNDP and RDPP (forthcoming 2018) Development of evidence-
based policy options and frameworks for the accommodation of refugees 
in countries affected by the Syria Crisis.
7. UNDP (forthcoming 2018) The Resilience Agenda: a progress report.
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Lesson 1: Governmental approval is 
necessary – but not enough
Experiences with the Jordan Compact show 
that while the approval of governmental 
actors is crucial to shifting policy, effecting 
real change on the ground requires more 
than this. Implementing agencies have 
shown great sensitivity in scoping out 
what is politically acceptable in the given 
context, and have built strong cooperative 
relations with the Jordanian government. 
However, governmental positions do not 
necessarily reflect or fully account for the 
deeper dynamics shaping a state’s political 
economy or labour market. Incorporating the 
rationales of other stakeholders is equally 
crucial for the success of any intervention. 
This is illustrated by the strong initial 
focus on recruiting Syrians to work in 
the garment industry. In negotiations, 
government representatives emphasised 
employment in this sector because a) 
it is labour-intensive and could thus 
potentially absorb many Syrians, and b) 
the workforce is predominantly migrant 
labour, so ‘substituting’ them with 
Syrians would mean that Syrians were 
not ‘competing’ with Jordanians. This 
proposed substitution implies a disregard 
for the rights and circumstances of the 
existing migrant workforce in Jordan, and 
attempts to effect it have been unsuccessful 
to date. In spite of holding job fairs, and 
offering Syrians information sessions and 
invitations to visit factories, by the end 
of 2016 only 30 Syrians, out of a target of 
2,000, were being employed in the garment 
sector.3 Employers did not consider that 
their existing workforce, of mostly South 
Asian migrant workers, would be easily 
replaced by Syrians since the working 
conditions – with long hours, low wages, 
long commutes – and lack of childcare made 
working in the factories very unappealing 
to most Syrians. These exploitative working 
conditions have been imposed on migrant 
workers in Jordan for many years, as human 
rights advocates have highlighted.4  
A new round of recruitment began in the 
summer of 2017 when work permits were 
also introduced for camp residents. This time, 
with UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, and 
international non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) organising transportation and 
training, and since some of the camp 
residents’ basic living expenses are covered 
by humanitarian actors, this has proven 
somewhat more attractive to employers 
as well as Syrians, thereby pulling more 
Syrians into this exploitative labour regime. 
Yet some of the aforementioned factors 
remain unchanged, which have, to date, 
prevented the recruitment of Syrians on 
a substantial scale. This would have been 
clear in advance if the views and needs of 
Syrians had been taken into account from 
the beginning of the scheme, demonstrating 
that labour market interventions for 
refugees must account for the perspectives 
of the populations they target, even when 
these perspectives run contrary to the 
government’s preferred solutions. 
Lesson 2: The critics are sometimes right
Secondly, critical voices were marginalised 
during the development and implementation 
of the Compact. Much of the deepest and 
most relevant knowledge regarding Jordan’s 
economic circumstances is found among 
Jordanians affiliated with research centres, 
NGOs or working as consultants but this 
expertise was not often called upon, nor 
was it well integrated into programming. 
Similarly, foreign experts on Jordan and 
the region were largely excluded from the 
design process and their words of warning 
ignored. Instead, those drafting the Compact 
pursued a generalised blueprint which 
failed to take sufficient account of the 
intricate and specific dynamics of Jordan’s 
political economy and labour market.
The consequences of this have become 
apparent, as for example in the plans to 
use Special Economic Zones (SEZs) as an 
incubator of change. It was expected that 
stakeholders would be able to encourage 
investment in SEZs, particularly in 
manufacturing, and thereby provide 
employment for Syrians and Jordanians 
alike. The centrepiece of this was 
renegotiated terms of trade between the 
European Union (EU) and Jordan, which 
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now allow preferential access to European 
markets for firms based in particular 
zones and employing Syrian refugees as a 
minimum proportion of their workforce.
Yet as activists, NGOs and labour market 
experts have long argued, employers in these 
zones favour workers whom they see as more 
productive, and whom they can exploit more 
easily. Migrant workers living on site, who are 
separated from their families who live outside 
Jordan, can be compelled to work longer hours 
than city-based Syrians with families waiting 
at home. This has prevented large-scale 
recruitment of both Jordanian and Syrians 
workers throughout the manufacturing sector.
Similarly, academics and practitioners 
have pointed out that SEZs, in Jordan and 
elsewhere, regularly fail to attract the 
desired investment or to positively affect 
the broader economy. Regarding Jordan 
specifically, country experts have highlighted 
that SEZs remain unattractive investments 
for many firms because of relatively high 
production and transportation costs 
compared with competitors. They have 
also stressed that manufacturers working 
within SEZs are largely oriented towards 
markets within the region, especially 
Iraq and Syria. As a result, they have little 
experience with the import standards 
required by the EU single market and often 
lack the ability to meet those standards. 
The EU-Jordan trade renegotiations,5 
pushed through in a hurry to demonstrate 
successful follow-through, did little 
to tackle such factors. Had the critical 
expertise on such dynamics been 
appreciated differently and incorporated 
from the start, the Jordan Compact might 
have set off on a very different path.
Lesson 3: Do not lose sight of underlying 
goals
Thirdly, in the process of implementing the 
Compact, much of its progressive potential 
has been lost. Many stakeholders initially 
envisioned the Compact as a tool for 
improving the working rights and conditions 
of Syrians, while also benefiting Jordanian 
workers. Faced with the long-standing and 
deeply-ingrained dynamics of the Jordanian 
labour market, however, implementing 
agencies have abandoned such goals. 
Rather, meeting formal targets set by donors 
and implementing agencies themselves 
has turned into a goal in and of itself. 
This is clearly demonstrated by attempts 
to formalise the labour of Syrians who were 
already working in Jordan informally. These 
attempts have been confronted with the 
reality that huge swathes of the Jordanian 
economy have operated informally or semi-
formally for decades, and many of the actors 
involved have strong incentives to keep it 
that way. In sectors such as agriculture and 
construction, for example, jobs are often 
obtained with the assistance of brokers. 
Egyptian migrants have long dominated 
these sectors – both as workers and brokers 
– and to re-populate them with registered 
Syrians runs strongly against their interests. 
Similarly, employers in various sectors benefit 
financially from informality, for example by 
not having to pay social security contributions 
or work permit fees for (any of) their 
employees. Employees, in turn, may prefer the 
flexibility that informal work affords them, 
compared with the one-year commitment to 
a specific employer that most work permits in 
Jordan entail. Each of these practices makes 
informal labour difficult to formalise.
Faced with such challenges, implementing 
agencies have focused more and more on 
ways to increase the number of work permits 
issued, this being the most important 
condition for obtaining more funding from 
the World Bank and donor governments. 
They have done this, for example, by 
using cooperatives and unions as proxy 
employers, enabling Syrians to get work 
permits in sectors where labour is seasonal 
and employees move between individual 
employers. Any concerted attempt to tackle 
the conditions that push Syrians into poor 
and precarious working conditions and 
keep them there, however, has been lost 
along the way. As a result, Syrians now 
holding work permits typically report that 
while they feel less exposed to the risk of 
deportation, they have seen no substantial 
improvements in their working conditions 
and they shoulder most of the costs associated 
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with formalisation, such as paying fees 
that are legally supposed to be borne by 
employers. Furthermore, other populations 
that are not covered by the work permits 
target, including Jordanian workers, migrant 
workers and non-Syrian refugees, do not 
stand to gain much from its implementation. 
In effect, a lot of the progressive potential 
of the formalisation drive has been lost. 
Conclusion
Labour market access can be crucial 
for refugees seeking to build dignified 
lives in exile. Facilitating that access 
can therefore have the potential to 
significantly improve refugees’ material 
and psychosocial circumstances. That does 
not make success a foregone conclusion, 
however. As this article has outlined, 
recent experiences in Jordan offer at least 
three key lessons for humanitarian actors 
attempting livelihoods interventions. 
First, governmental approval is 
necessary for livelihoods interventions 
to take place but a government’s position 
may not accurately reflect the reality of 
complex labour market challenges, nor the 
perspectives of other stakeholders who 
will be crucial to an intervention’s success. 
Second, humanitarian agencies and NGOs 
should seek to utilise existing expertise and 
knowledge, particularly from individuals and 
organisations from the host country itself, 
even when they voice concerns rather than 
enthusiastically embrace proposed strategies; 
fully understanding the challenges, which 
are often both structural and long-standing, 
must be the starting point for humanitarian 
livelihoods interventions. Third, formal 
targets and indicators should reflect the 
underlying goals of a scheme, otherwise 
the potential for progress may never be 
realised. Only by learning and acting on these 
lessons – and, additionally, by incorporating 
refugees’ voices and perspectives into 
livelihoods interventions from the start –
will it be possible to develop strategies that 
can actually offer dignified, decent and 
sustainable work opportunities for refugees. 
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This Syrian refugee now works for a Jordanian farmer, having obtained (with help from his employer) a work permit from the government.
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